[oman-l] International conference on "Confidence-Building Measures in the Gulf" in Salala

[Joachim Duester]

The following message was originally broadcasted on the 
Gulf2000-List , the mailing list of the Gulf/2000 Project.
Joachim Duester, Oman Studies Centre, http://www.oman.org

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The following is a report on the most recent Gulf/2000 international
conference. It was prepared by Gary Sick, Lawrence Potter, and Gina
Cinali. It is not comprehensive, and many participants might disagree with
some of the characterizations of the proceedings. The report is longer
than most of our postings to the Gulf/2000 list, but we thought you might
find it interesting as an overview of current political issues in the
Persian Gulf region. It will also be posted in Thread 37 on the members
only website. Comments are welcome.

Begin Text:

The Gulf/2000 Project, in cooperation with Sheikh Saif al-Maskery and the
Center for Research and Consultancy in Oman, held its seventh
international conference on "Confidence-Building Measures in the Gulf" in
Salalah, Oman, from November 9-12, 1999. This was a follow-up meeting to
one sponsored by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI) in Nizwa, Oman, in March 1998.

Background

More than 40 experts participated from all eight Persian Gulf states (20
Arabs, 5 Iranians), as well as Europe (5) and the United States (8
including staff), plus several local observers. Participants included
government officials (both civil and military), academics, businessmen and
independent analysts. Most of the presentations were made by people from
the littoral states, in keeping with Gulf/2000's objective of promoting
communication within the region. In that sense, the meeting was itself a
confidence-building measure.

The conference opened with a review of the CBM process: what it is, how it
has worked in other parts of the world, and its relevance to the Gulf.
Presenters representing Kuwait, Oman, Iran and Iraq then considered Gulf
security from a regional perspective. One session was devoted to maritime
boundary and resource disputes, including the islands issue between Iran
and the UAE and possible avenues for resolution. Another panel addressed
"soft" security issues, such as unemployment, rapid population growth,
lack of opportunity for women and erratic oil prices that affect all
regional states. The meeting closed with a roundtable discussion by five
prominent observers on prospects and suggestions for specific CBMs that
might work in the Gulf.

The conference was off the record and participants' comments were not for
attribution. Some of the major issues, controversies and suggestions are
summarized below.

CBMs in the Gulf

A key question was how to create a climate for confidence- building
measures in the Gulf. There is no security, one Emirati pointed out,
without dialogue and communication. CBMs will not work if the political
climate is not conducive to discussion.

Some participants noted, however, that talking is not always constructive.
It can exacerbate disagreements as well as resolve them. The nature and
management of the dialogue is important. Ideally, the parties should begin
in the belief that their conflicts can and should be resolved, even if
they disagree deeply about when and how that might happen.

The harmful influence of rhetoric was underscored--words count. At the
same time, Iranian participants warned against scouring obscure
publications in Iran's burgeoning media for inflammatory statements made
primarily for domestic political purposes.

The point was made several times that CBMs are not foreign to the region
and should not be thought of as a western process. There is ample
precedent for states working together to solve problems and even to share
sovereignty (the two neutral zones, set up in the 1920s, being a good
example and a precedent for the Abu Musa Memorandum of Understanding). In
more recent times, many Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states took part in
the ACRS (Arms Control and Regional Security) talks. On the other hand,
one of the reasons that ACRS foundered was that it was not inclusive
(Iran, Iraq and Syria did not participate).

CBMs need to have some support in society, even in authoritarian ones.
States should therefore encourage the discussion of CBMs to move from the
elite to a popular level. CBMs in the West have developed over a long time
frame, and without the recent experience of war or a single outside
hegemon. CBMs are part of a long-term process to transform attitudes.

Threat Perceptions

Many states in the region suffer from an exaggerated sense of
vulnerability and victimization. This was so pronounced in the discussion
that it gave rise to the half-joking suggestion that the body of water be
renamed the Gulf of Victimization.

Several Arab participants made strong statements expressing the sense of
threat that the Arab states feel from Iran. The Iranian participants, who
were conscious of the "good neighbor" policy that Iran had been pursuing
and who were more concerned about threats from Iraq and Afghanistan, were
taken aback by this.

Arabs noted that Iran is a regional superpower; its size and its
tumultuous politics make such fears inevitable. Several Arab participants
suggested that as the largest power in the region, Iran had a
responsibility to take the lead in reassuring the Arab states of its
intentions and desisting from inflammatory rhetoric over the islands. As
one Kuwaiti remarked, identities are not permanent: they are made, evolve
and change. The same is true for the perception of threats. He wondered if
the notion of an Iranian threat had now become part of the Arab identity.

Divisions Among the Gulf States

The Arab participants also stressed the differences between the northern
and southern Arab states of the Gulf. Those in the north, particularly
Kuwait, were concerned primarily about the threat from Iraq. The southern
states, especially the UAE, were more relaxed about Iraq and focused
primarily on the islands dispute. In the northern Gulf, arms-control
measures are needed (between Iran and Iraq and Iraq and Kuwait), whereas
in the southern Gulf, CBMs are more suitable.

Divisions also existed between the larger Arab states and their smaller
neighbors. Some felt that the large-small distinction was no less
significant than the Arab-Persian divide. Specifically, the Saudi-Iranian
rapprochement aroused suspicions among the smaller Gulf states, who felt
their interests might be sacrificed. The small states feel they are not
taken seriously by their larger neighbors.

There was criticism of the GCC Peninsula Shield force as it now exists,
including pointed references to its failure at the time of the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait. Several participants felt that Peninsula Shield should
be fashioned into a larger and more effective deterrent force, as proposed
by Oman.

Oman was regarded as a model of how CBMs could develop in the region: it
maintains ties to all states in the region and tries to promote intra-GCC
military cooperation. In that context, an Arab participant noted that two
types of CBMs are required: one between the GCC states themselves; and the
other between the GCC and external powers.

Territorial Disputes

A great deal of discussion and heated debate was devoted to the dispute
over Iran's presence on the three islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs. An
Emirati said that Iran's military maneuvers near the islands, its failure
to conduct direct negotiations and its deployment of missiles were major
problems that needed to be resolved. An Iranian commented that the two
sides should not be asking whether to relinquish or keep the islands but
rather how to cooperate in sharing sovereignty and avoiding hostilities.

One participant noted that new technology has greatly reduced the
strategic importance of the islands, while commercial sharing of the
undersea resources of the islands has been unaffected by political
differences. Thus, the dispute today is largely one of competing symbolic
claims and national pride, which may render it even more difficult to
resolve. The UAE success in internationalizing the islands dispute has
tended to harden the Iranian position and turn it into a domestic
political issue.

A geographer suggested that regional states should think not in terms of
solving all outstanding territorial disputes, but rather in managing them
over the long term. The easy disputes have been settled, and perhaps the
most one can hope for regarding the difficult ones (Iran/Iraq,
Iraq/Kuwait, Iran/UAE) is that they remain dormant.

U.S. Policy

Uncertainty about future U.S. policy is inhibiting planning and delaying
some states from taking more responsibility for settling domestic and
regional issues. The GCC states, for example, are too dependent upon
American protection and have not developed an indigenous defense force.
Iranians believe the UAE has forced the islands issue only because it is
assured of U.S. protection.

The United States was criticized for failing to explain adequately its
long-term plans and policies for Gulf security, including whether it plans
to remain in the Gulf permanently. An American noted that the United
States should no longer be regarded as a broker but rather as a major
player in the region, with its own interests. The mistaken belief that the
United States can solve all regional problems only leads to missed
opportunities for the regional states to deal with their own problems.

The Arab view is ambivalent: they worry about the political effect of the
U.S. presence, but they also worry about what would happen if the United
States should withdraw its protection. Plans need to take account of a
possibly reduced U.S. role in the future.

The potential U.S. response to some CBMs is uncertain. While it might
welcome measures to reduce incidents at sea or give advance notification
of military maneuvers (to an international third party?), the United
States would probably oppose closer Iran-GCC relations, particularly
military ones.

The lack of a viable future policy on Iraq was also very troubling. One
participant characterized U.S. efforts to replace Saddam Hussein as
"Operation Just Kidding." An Emirati commented on the lack of debate in
the Gulf on the future of Iraq and the tendency of the dialogue to adopt
an American frame of reference (as in "containment plus"). There was
widespread agreement on the need to address the question of alternative
futures in Iraq.

Hard vs Soft Security

Although CBMs are often regarded as military in nature, a number of
participants cited the importance of "soft" issues and noted that real
security has to be comprehensive. The role of peoples and societies is
just as important as governments when it comes to security. As one
Bahraini participant noted, "the soft issues are the hard ones." Even
Omani military observers emphasized the necessity for a broader,
non-military concept of CBMs. Because of this feeling, an extra session on
this subject was added to the agenda.

Some non-military CBMs that were cited are environmental cooperation,
tourism, and exchanges between academics, clerics and the media. Given the
miniscule level of outside investment in the region, much more attention
should be focused on the reforms needed to attract it. Some regretted the
absence of private strategic study centers in the Gulf, claiming that most
centers are government owned and adopt government positions.

"Hard" and "soft" security issues are linked. If the domestic situation is
insecure, states will feel more insecure internationally. One participant
suggested that regional states should address this issue by adopting a
code of conduct.

One suggestion heard repeatedly was the need for mutual economic
development as a CBM. Regional states have a good record of cooperating
economically, such as Iran-Qatar exploitation of a common gas field or
even, in the case of Abu Musa island, sharing of oil revenues between Iran
and the UAE. Common interest in economic projects at the head of the Gulf
might help put a damper on political conflict and rhetoric. Regional
states, for example, could help allay Iraqi fears by offering help with
reconstruction and debt forgiveness.

An Iranian participant noted that because of close economic ties (and
despite strained political relations), there are some 70 flights a day
between Iran and the UAE. In the case of Oman, however, with which Iran
has excellent political and military ties and few economic ones, there are
no direct flights.

Regional Security Arrangements

A number of participants cited the need for a regional security accord of
a comprehensive nature. Iran has proposed a regional non-aggression pact,
and it was suggested that Iran and Yemen (possibly later Iraq and even
Pakistan/India) could be invited as observers to GCC meetings. There is
also a lack of local mechanisms to solve disputes and no consensus on
resort to international institutions (such as the ICJ). Iraq experts
thought it unlikely that Iraq under Saddam Hussein would be willing to
participate in serious regional CBMs, especially if it involved even
symbolic loss of sovereignty.

Conclusion

Over the three days of the conference, a diverse group of experts from the
region and elsewhere identified key issues of security and a wide range of
confidence-building measures that might be used to reduce tensions and the
risk of conflict. There was no attempt to force a consensus, but most of
the participants agreed that they came away with a much better
understanding of the concerns that fuel political attitudes among their
neighbors.

Discussions were serious, constructive and utterly candid. Personal
contacts were deepened among specialists, many of whom seldom have the
opportunity to meet each other. Most of the participants have close
contact with their respective governments, and they have the opportunity
to inject the insights from the conference into the national debates of
their home states.

That process of building personal networks and a realistic appreciation of
difficult political issues is the essential purpose of the Gulf/2000
Project and the series of seven international conferences that it has
sponsored over the past six years. We are very grateful to Sheikh Saif
al-Maskery for his invaluable assistance, and to the W. Alton Jones and
MacArthur Foundations for their generous support.

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