[Oman-L] AL-SAYIGH'S DEPORTATION AND A WARMING OF SAUDI-IRANIAN RELATIONS

[Moh .]

POLICYWATCH
Number 255 June 17, 1997

AL-SAYIGH'S DEPORTATION AND A WARMING OF SAUDI-IRANIAN RELATIONS
By Joshua Teitelbaum


Today's announcement of the deal between U.S. law enforcement officials and 
Hani al-Sayigh, an alleged member of the clandestine Shi`i organization 
"Saudi Hizballah" with links to the al-Khobar Towers bombing, has strategic, 
not just legal, implications for the investigation of that terrorist act. 
The decision to seek al-Sayigh's deportation to the United States and his 
cooperation in gaining information about al-Khobar suggests that the United 
States may in fact be willing to grapple with the ramifications of what 
al-Sayigh has to say about Iran's possible complicity. Meanwhile, thousands 
of miles away, as Secretary of Defense Cohen promotes "dual containment" 
with America's Gulf allies, an equally intriguing development is afoot-a 
tentative rapprochement between a victim of al-Khobar, Saudi Arabia, and the 
state many observers believe is chiefly responsible for it, Iran.
>From Conflict to Reconciliation? Generally, Saudi-Iranian relations are best 
understood within the context of both Islamic and nationalist tensions. The 
two countries represent competing visions of the Islamic past and future and 
vie for domination in the Persian/Arabian Gulf (the battle over this term is 
a case in point). One arena in which the two parties have played out these 
tensions since the Islamic revolution in Iran has been at the annual 
pilgrimage (the hajj). As head of the Saudi Royal Family, King Fahd has 
declared himself since 1986 to be the "Custodian of the Two Holy Shrines," a 
title until then reserved only for the now-defunct caliphate. The Saudi 
family guards this role jealously, and sees an obligation and a 
responsibility to facilitate the now close to 2 million strong pilgrimage. 
However, its approach to the hajj is very simple: "Muslims, perform your 
duty, avoid politics and then go home."

For revolutionary Iran, on the other hand, the pilgrimage is a magnificent, 
God-given vehicle for promoting and exporting the Islamic Revolution. Each 
year, Iran's contingent to the pilgrimage attempts to perform a ceremony cum 
political demonstration (which, as far as this writer can tell, did not 
exist before the Revolution) called "Disavowing the Infidels" (al-bara'a min 
al-kuffar, or al-bara'a min al-mushrikin). During this event, the faithful 
condemn America, Israel, and other "enemies of Islam" and, by implication, 
the Saudi government. The Saudi `ulama have branded this demonstration 
bid`a, un-Islamic innovation, and have forbidden it each year, although Iran 
claims that it still carries it out. In 1987, Saudi attempts to prevent the 
ceremony resulted in the death of 275 Iranian pilgrims and 85 Saudi 
policemen. Iran deeply resents Saudi attempts to pose as the paragon of 
Islam while being an ally of "the Great Satan," and may have assisted 
directly or indirectly in the al-Khobar bombing in order to send a strong 
signal of disapproval to both Riyadh and Washington and to carry on the 
campaign to evict the "infidels" from the Gulf.

In this context, recent indications of a honeymoon of sorts between these 
longstanding regional and ideological rivals are perplexing. Low-level talks 
aimed at improving relations began in late 1996, leading one Iranian paper 
to talk about a "new chapter" in bilateral ties. In mid-March 1997, Iranian 
Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati visited the Kingdom in order to invite 
King Fahd to the December summit of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference, which Tehran seeks to host. Saudi Crown Prince `Abdallah and 
Iranian President Rafsanjani met in Islamabad later that month, and the two 
countries announced the signing of an air transport protocol on March 30. 
Although the visit never materialized, Iranian officials stated that 
Rafsanjani intended to make this year's April hajj. Iranian officials were 
surprisingly mild in response to the death of over 200 pilgrims during the 
1997 hajj. Last month, Fahd congratulated Iranian President-elect Mohammed 
Khatemi on his victory, and Khatemi wired back his hope for the "opening of 
a new page" in bilateral relations. Together, all this hardly sounds like 
the beating war drums of states with daggers drawn.

Between Sunni and Shi`i Opposition: The key to understanding this shift in 
Saudi-Iranian ties lies in understanding Saudi domestic politics. Saudi 
Arabia is a country founded on a rigidly orthodox Sunni creed "Wahhabism," 
yet it has witnessed a growing Sunni opposition since the Gulf War. While 
perhaps not well-organized, this opposition is quite vocal. In mid-1996, 
four young Sunni oppositionists were executed for the November 1995 bombing 
of the U.S.-run Office of the Program Manager/Saudi Arabian National Guard 
headquarters in Riyadh, which took the lives of five Americans. It is this 
opposition which is of most concern to the Saudis, as it carries the 
potential of undermining the Islamic legitimacy of the regime. On the other 
hand, the Shi`i opposition, while not a major threat to the regime's 
legitimacy-Shi`is are only 12-15 percent of the population, and their type 
of Islam is anathema to most Saudis-has lately become more active. In August 
1996, hundreds were reportedly arrested in the Eastern Province. Though 
Saudis certainly wish they had no Shi`i problem, they have found a silver 
lining in highlighting the Shi`i threat, i.e., it diverts popular and media 
away from the more serious Sunni challenge. Indeed, given that Shi`is are a 
minority, Riyadh can-both comfortably and legitimately-point a finger at an 
outside instigator: Iran.

Unofficially, the Saudis have let it be known that they suspect that local 
Shi`i members of a shadowy group called Saudi Hizballah, acting with Iranian 
help, carried out the bombing of the al-Khobar housing complex on June 25, 
1996, killing nineteen American airmen and wounding hundreds of others. In 
light of the involvement of Sunni radicals in the earlier Riyadh bombing, it 
served Saudi interests to let it be known that the perpetrators of al-Khobar 
Towers were not from its Sunni majority. But, having done that, Riyadh was 
left with the big unknown: If there was convincing proof of Iran's 
complicity, would the United States retaliate? And, if so, how? While 
President Clinton is on record saying that clear Iranian complicity would 
trigger U.S. retaliation, it remains unclear exactly what standard of proof 
the Americans would require and what would be the nature of the retaliation.

For the Saudis, any direct U.S. retaliation would involve a temporary 
wounding of Saudi pride a non-Islamic "older brother" sticking up for its 
Muslim "little brother." But if Washington is going to respond anyway, 
Riyadh prefers that it be a heavy blow, an operation that would amount to a 
strategic military setback for Iran, instead of the rather ineffectual 
pinpricks which the Kingdom has witnessed being inflicted on Baghdad in 
recent years. Even though Secretary of Defense Cohen affirmed "dual 
containment" to the Saudis during his current Gulf trip, the flood of 
speculation in Washington regarding possible shifts in Gulf strategy, 
coupled with the lack of a strong U.S. and UN reaction to Iraq's continued 
flouting of the UNSCOM inspection regime, have left Riyadh concerned at 
Washington's diminishing resolve.

Against this background, the normally puzzling phenomenon of a warming trend 
in Saudi-Iranian relations makes sense. Since Riyadh is not sure if or how 
the United States will react, it prefers to pre-empt the worst of all 
possible U.S. actions-a retaliation strong enough to arouse the Iranians' 
ire at Saudi Arabia but too weak to actually cause lasting damage to Iranian 
military or strategic assets-by proactively improving relations with Tehran 
while encouraging Iran to hand over anti-Saudi Hizballah activists that it 
harbors. For its part, Iran may be interested in exploiting Saudi fears to 
ensure Riyadh's stamp of approval for Tehran's hosting of the OIC summit in 
December, a major event that would mark the Islamic world's full 
confirmation of the legitimacy of the Islamic revolution.

Deporting al-Sayigh: Until today, the biggest question mark surrounded 
al-Sayigh, whom the Canadian Security Intelligence Service believes to be a 
member of Saudi Hizballah and to have participated directly in the al-Khobar 
bombing. Saudi Arabia would understandably like to get its hands on 
al-Sayigh, both to find out details of the al- Khobar attack and to control 
the flow of information about it; indeed, chances are likely that if he went 
to Saudi Arabia, al-Sayigh would soon be executed. Washington was reportedly 
hesitant to seek his extradition because it was not convinced it could 
obtain a conviction given the clandestine sources of the Canadian 
intelligence information on him. Alternatively, some argued that the 
prospect of a conviction that would directly implicate Iran in the al-Khobar 
blast, with the intense pressure to retaliate that would ensue, may itself 
have been giving the Administration pause. Now that al-Sayigh has decided to 
cooperate with U.S. law enforcement, what he has to reveal about Iran's role 
in al- Khobar and perhaps other terrorist activity has immense implications 
for the U.S.-Saudi-Iranian relationship and the direction of U.S. policy in 
the Gulf.

Joshua Teitelbaum is the Meyerhoff Visiting Fellow at The Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy


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